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Abstract—Anecdotal evidence suggests an increasing number
of people are turning to VPN services for the properties of
privacy, anonymity and free communication over the internet.
Despite this, there is little research into what these services are
actually being used for. We use DNS cache snooping to determine
what domains people are accessing through VPNs. This technique
is used to discover whether certain queries have been made
against a particular DNS server. Some VPNs operate their own
DNS servers, ensuring that any cached queries were made by
users of the VPN. We explore 3 methods of DNS cache snooping
and briefly discuss their strengths and limitations. Using the most
reliable of the methods, we perform a DNS cache snooping scan
against the DNS servers of several major VPN providers. With
this we discover which domains are actually accessed through
VPNs. We run this technique against popular domains, as well
as those known to be censored in certain countries; China,
Indonesia, Iran, and Turkey. Our work gives a glimpse into what
users use VPNs for, and provides a technique for discovering the
frequency with which domain records are accessed on a DNS
server.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasing global government crackdowns on internet pri-
vacy, anonymity and free communication have found users
looking for technologies which they believe can help restore
these properties. One of these is the Virtual Private Network
(VPN). While not originally designed for this purpose, nev-
ertheless, many have turned to them, often over technologies
specifically designed with such properties in mind e.g. Tor [9],
Psiphon [5], and Signal [21][6]. VPNs allow users to trivially,
quickly and cheaply make it appear as if they are connecting
from a different IP address and location, giving users a sense
of anonymity and allowing access to content that may not be
accessible through their regular internet connection. They also
encrypt traffic between the client and VPN gateway, preventing
or hindering network traffic analysis or surveillance. They are
in widespread use in countries with strict internet censorship
regimes [22][2], and they are being increasingly targeted
to prevent this use. Most VPN providers advertise on the
basis of evading censorship and surveillance [12][16][29], and
there has been academic work either implicitly or explicitly
assuming this connection [24][26][30]. Possibly the largest
internet censorship regime on the planet is currently attempting
to block, remove or regulate their use [15][19].
Despite this, VPNs are not always designed and imple-
mented with strong security, anonymity or privacy guarantees.
Due to the ease of setting up a VPN, there are many organisa-
tions offering both free and paid VPN services. Many of these
are fairly basic, and cannot offer the same level of security as
technologies which are designed with these requirements in
mind [1][25].
VPNs create an encrypted tunnel between the client and
the VPN gateway. Once this tunnel is established, regular
IP routing is used to make requests such as accessing web
content. This requires access to Domain Name System (DNS)
servers. There is no standardised way for VPNs to handle DNS
infrastructure, and so most VPNs handle these requests in their
own way: some making no provision for DNS requests, others
forwarding requests onto public servers such as 8.8.8.8 [10],
and others still operating DNS servers themselves. Over time,
users of VPN services seeking privacy and anonymity have
become aware of the risks of deanonymisation through DNS
requests. As a result, an increasing number of VPN services
now include a DNS resolution service internal to the VPN.
However these DNS servers can reveal information about the
users and uses of these VPN services.
II. DNS CACHE SNOOPING
DNS cache snooping is a technique that allows the discovery
and analysis of DNS records that a particular server has
cached. While it cannot (ordinarily) be used to breach the
privacy of individual users, it can be used against services
to discover what users are collectively using the service
for. While a known technique, there is little academic work
focusing on it [13]. Using DNS cache snooping it is possible
to perform an analysis on which domains are being queried
against that server and how frequently they are being accessed.
Private VPN subscriptions typically come with an applica-
tion or OpenVPN [36] configuration file which makes changes
to the network interface of the client host. There has been some
concern in the VPN community about ‘DNS leaks’, where
user anonymity is compromised by DNS requests sent to third
party DNS servers [23][33][34]. In response, VPN services are
increasingly offering their own internal DNS server to prevent
requests leaving the network. Normally these servers are only
available once connected to the VPN1.
For this work we focused on those VPN providers which
offered their own DNS servers. Once we were connected to
the VPN we made repeat DNS queries for domains we were
1During our analsysis we found one instance of a possibly misconfigured
VPN DNS server which was accessible over the open internet.
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2interested in. There were three possible ways to carry out DNS
cache snooping scan from this position.
TTL with no recursive queries – The first method is to
query a DNS server with the Recursion Desired flag set to 0.
This flag is intended to prevent the server from performing
a recursive lookup in the case that the entry is not cached
locally. If no cached record is returned then we know that no
user has made a recent query for this domain or that the DNS
server does not return anything when RD is 0. This period
is determined by the maximum DNS TTL setting which is
configured on the authoritative DNS server for that domain.
This value is set in seconds, and states the amount of time
a caching DNS server should hold that record before letting
it expire. Once it expires, a new request must be sent to get
a fresh record. Unfortunately, DNS servers are not required
to respect the Recursion Desired flag. Upon receiving these
requests some servers perform a standard recursive lookup for
that domain. While servers respecting this flag can be found
on the open internet, for the purposes of this work we did not
find any internal VPN DNS servers that did so.
TTL with recursive queries – The second method is
similar but does not rely on the Recursion Desired flag. Instead
we wait for the cached record to expire, and then wait for an
additional period no longer than the maximum observed TTL
for that domain, before making our own query. By subtracting
the remaining TTL from the query from the maximum TTL
for that domain, we see how long it took for the record to be
refreshed after expiring.
This method relies on knowing the maximum TTL for each
record on that server. TTL values are set by the authoritative
server for that domain, but we found in practice that some DNS
servers do not respect this. In response, a precursor step to this
approach is discovering the maximum TTL for a domain on
a per server basis.
This approach is less ideal than the first as our queries
pollute the DNS server’s cache. Because of this there are
periods of time where we are unable to observe queries for
this domain: as the records are cached and counting down
from our request. As a result more data is needed to get the
same accuracy in results. However this approach is reliable
and works on almost all DNS servers we tested against2, and
is the method that we ultimately used
Time based – The third method of DNS cache snooping is
timing based, depending on whether the query is cached on
that server, or if the server has to make a recursive lookup
for this domain. This technique is ideal for highly frequented
domains or active DNS servers, and can identify granularities
of frequency of less than one second. Unfortunately this
approach is susceptible to network jitter and fluctuating delay
variations caused by third party DNS services and CDNs.
We found that although there is a large increase in response
time when making a request for a domain that is not cached,
such response time differences were common. The majority
of requests we made that took an increased amount of time
to respond to were unpredictable jitter, rather than recursively
2The only server did not work on was the aforementioned server that was
refreshing its cache before the TTL had expired
retrieving a record from another server. This is likely not an
insurmountable problem, and can probably be overcome with
enough data and noise filtering techniques.
III. METHODS
We ran our experiment against three internal DNS servers
belonging to popular subscription VPN services. To make
requests to these services a client had to be connected to
the VPN. Once connected they were able to make requests
and perform DNS cache snooping to see which domains were
being accessed. All of these experiments were run during April
and May 2018.
Popular Domains – The first stage of our experiment was
run against 1000 popular domains. This list was taken from
the Majestic Million [20]. We choose this top domains list
as it is based on web backlinks, similarly to how we choose
our most popular censored domains (described below) [31].
11 of these domains had expired or were not live [3], so these
domains were removed and replaced with new domains from
the list to keep the total at 1000. These inactivate domains
were primarily service subdomains which had recently been
disabled and were no longer in use.
Censored domains – The second stage of the experiment
we repeated against popular domains that we knew to be
censored. We gathered these domains using the technique
described by Darer et al. [7][8]. This list was also based on
backlinks from web pages, similar to the Majestic Million, and
so domains with more links to it from other sites were chosen
over those domains that only had a few backlinks. Domains
which were duplicates between the lists were removed, as were
domains that had expired and consistently failed to resolve to
an IP address.
Language specific censored domains – For the third and
final stage of the experiment we ran the process against
language specific domains. One weakness of our method
is that we are unable to tell who accessed a record for a
domain: only that it was accessed. Many of the domains in
these lists contained content that is relevant to a wide variety
of nationalities, for example facebook.com or blogger.com.
These platforms allow the publication of a wide variety of
content, and it is impossible for us to say whether someone
is accessing this from say Indonesia (or, to access Indonesian
related content), or from another country entirely.
With this in mind, and to find domains where the content
was specific to the four countries that we were looking at,
we decided to separate these domains by language. From
here we classified domains based on 1) the language of the
content of the landing page, and 2) the HTML ISO language
code. Domains where these two pieces of information gave
conflicting reports had their content checked manually. Do-
main content classification was performed with the Google
Compact Language Detector v3 (CLD3) open library [28].
After language classifying the web content of the pages we
removed the domains where the content was primarily in a
language that was different to the country it was censored
from. For example, we found that shahrvand.com was censored
in Iran, and that its primary language was Farsi, so we kept
3it in the language specific list. Blogger.com contained a large
variety of languages and was not specific to any one country,
and so was removed. Using this method we ensured we kept
only those domains which contained content that was directly
related to the country that had restricted access to it. As these
domains were known censored in their home countries, and
as the language of these pages is specific to those countries,
using accessing these domains through the VPN were likely
to be doing so for the purposes of censorship evasion.
Initially we tried to query the authoritative servers for each
domain to discover their maximum TTL, but we found that
some servers did not respect this. For these domains we had
to manually discover the maximum TTLs being used for each
server domain pair. We began this process by sending a single
query for each domain. This query returned a TTL value
stating when the record was due to expire. We then repeatedly
polled the DNS server for that domain as the TTL value
counted down. When this value reached 0 it would roll over
and return the suspected maximum TTL. This process was
rerun until the same maximum TTL had been seen for a given
domain 5 times, to ensure we had the correct value. In practice
the first observed suspected maximum TTL was the finally
accepted value in >95% of cases. Additionally, all observed
maximum TTLs were ‘round numbers’. Of our entire dataset,
>96% were multiples of 60 seconds, and those that were not
were multiples of either 15 or 20 seconds. This approach gave
us high confidence that we had found the correct maximum
TTL for each server domain pair.
One server was found that this approach did not work on.
This server reset the cache record for an expiring domain when
the record was 3-5 seconds from expiring. This was noticed
early when looking for viable servers, and so the experiment
was not run against this server.
Another implementation issue we ran into was a VPN
service that used multiple DNS servers, each with their own
cache. When connecting to this VPN you were assigned into
a private network range. Within this range was a DNS server
to answer queries. The range entered was different each time
you connected, regardless of the location of the VPN endpoint
you choose, and the cache records of the DNS servers was not
shared between different network ranges. Our method worked
on these DNS servers, but ultimately we did not include them
in our data as each one got few hits from other users.
IV. FINDINGS
Over two months we observed just under 6 million DNS
queries for the 2000 domains. Some of these were accessed
frequently, such as instagram.com with 18378 hits, whereas
some were accessed infrequently, such as risheha.com with 1
hit. Our initial analysis of the dataset involved collating the
records from the different VPNs into one large dataset, and
calculating the frequency which domains were accessed over
all observed VPNs. As we know the time when each TTL
was due to expire and when it was refreshed (whether by us
or someone else) we can calculate the total observed period
per domain. We can divide this by the total observed refreshes
to get an estimate of the average refresh rate per domain.
Fig. 1. Most frequently accessed domains
For each domain we calculate the Poisson arrival rate, λ,
of x, where x is the number of events in a fixed time period.
The Poisson distribution is chosen in our initial modelling as
an appropriate function for modelling count data, under the
assumption that the variance and mean of the arrival rate are
equal. If we were to require more specific characterisation
of features of the traffic we might prefer a more flexible
distribution such as the negative binomial, which allows for
overdispersion in which the variance of the arrival rate is
greater than λ. For our restricted application of ranking mean
arrival rate of queries per domain, however, the Poisson is a
widely-used and efficient approximation.
P (x) = e
−λλx
x!
We then ranked each domain sorted by the ‘sample lambda’
- observed mean arrival rate (distinct from the ‘true’ arrival
rate):
λˆ = to
We calculated each of these to 95% confidence interval:
b = ±1.96
√
λˆ/o
V. DISCUSSION OF OBSERVED DOMAINS
Figure 1 shows the most frequently accessed domains. Pop-
ular social network sites such as twitter.com, instagram.com
and weibo.com were highly represented at the top of the list.
These sites encourage frequent user interaction, and also often
have an app to encourage mobile use.
Some of the domains are on the list because of applications
that regularly refresh their domains. High ranking exam-
ples of this are steamcommunity.com and soundhound.com,
which both operate apps with a clear need for regularly
communication with remote servers. Steam is a popular PC
4Fig. 2. Most frequently accessed domains (Indonesia)
Fig. 3. Most frequently accessed domains (Turkey)
gaming application, and also offers a mobile chat application
and mobile account authenticator. Soundhound is an audio
recognition company, that sends live audio samples to their
remote servers in order to identify them. Other domains
that fall into this category include ew.com, airbnb.com, and
platform.twitter.com. These applications are often in frequent
communication with their servers, which may result in a large
amount of queries for these domains.
There are some unexpected domains amongst the most
frequently accessed which required further investigation. se-
curityfocus.com and gigaom.com are unlikely to be websites
that people visit frequently and are not known to be associated
with applications. Why are these domains being refreshed so
regularly? After a further look into what these organisations
do we now believe that these domains are being refreshed
by automated internet research tools. Both organisations do
internet research and scanning, and Security Focus also offer
a range of downloadable tools. It is likely that some of these
scanners or tools are ’phoning home‘ for information sharing.
A single tool making constant requests for a particular domain
has the potential to quickly rise towards the top of our most
frequently refreshed domains list.
This uncertainty over what caused the query is one weak-
ness of the approach. From just the DNS cache it is impossible
to tell the cause of the query. Other causes of refreshed
domains could include web crawlers, hotlinked content, or
third party content or scripts embedded into other pages. Each
of these would cause a request for the domain name, and
from the cache alone it is impossible to know the cause. A
consequence of this is that this technique only works if no one
else is doing it. If this technique becomes popular amongst
researchers, its results become meaningless.
However, as our approach differentiates between parent
and subdomain there are some other interesting findings
that shine light on the differences between automated and
human requests in some circumstances. An example of this
is that platform.twitter.com is accessed far more frequently
than twitter.com. This subdomain is used by the Twitter API
available to third parties. It seems that in our dataset the API
subdomain was accessed far more frequently than the human
usable site. This exemplifies a pattern amongst the data, where
those domains associated with an app or tool feature more
frequently than those that are only accessed manually.
We were surprised how infrequently some popular domains
are accessed over the VPNs. While there are several domains
which have an average refresh period of 20 seconds or less,
this drops off rapidly. Of the full dataset only the 20 most
frequently accessed domains had an average refresh period of
less than 60 seconds. Initially we expected more domains to
be refreshed as soon as they expired. Only the 103 highest
frequency domains were accessed more regularly than once
every 1000 seconds.
The most frequently accessed domains in China are so-
cial networking sites known to be blocked in this region.
Most prominent among these are twitter.com, instagram.com,
facebook.com, youtube.com, and tumblr.com. There are also
several news or information sharing sites such as wsj.com,
storyify.com, archive.org, wikipedia.org and blogspot.com. As
5Fig. 4. Most frequently accessed domains (Farsi language)
our method is unable to differentiate between users attempting
to access these sites from China versus the rest of the world,
it is impossible for us to tell how much of this traffic is from
users attempting to circumvent censorship.
When performing the language specific breakdown, only
two of the countries seemed to be blocking a significant
amount of local language websites. China and Iran were both
found to be blocking local language sites, while Indonesia
and Turkey seemed to block domains primarily written in
other languages. Most of the language specific domains were
accessed fairly infrequently, but there are some that stand out.
Of the Farsi specific domains censored in Iran in Figure 4,
radiofarda.com is highly refreshed. Radio Farda is the Farsi
language station of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, funded
by the U.S government. This was by far the most frequently
accessed Iranian blocked Farsi language domain discovered,
and was refreshed on average every 150 seconds with 3000
hits over the observed period. It should be noted that there is
a Radio Farda mobile app, so it may be affected in a similar
way to some of the domains mentioned above. Similarly,
in China voachinese.com is the most frequently refreshed
blocked language specific domain in Figure 5. This is operated
by Voice of America, again funded by the US government.
Both Radio Liberty and Voice of America are US government
’soft power‘, and were recently classified as foreign agents by
Russia [27]. Because of their funding they are not reliant on
being commercially successful in their targeted countries. It is
interesting that they are still accessed frequently despite being
language specific and blocked in their targeted countries. As
these languages are specific to the countries where the domain
is blocked in, it is more likely that users of the VPN may be
doing so specifically to access blocked content.
Fig. 5. Most frequently accessed domains (Chinese language)
VI. RELATED RESEARCH
There has not been much work on DNS cache snooping
itself. A 2004 paper by Grangeia outlines the possibility of
DNS cache snooping, but does not implement it or use it to
measure relative popularity of domains [13]. In 2010 Krishnan
et al. point out that a similar cache snooping technique may
cause loss of privacy, specifically in the context of pre-
caching web content [18]. The risk of DNS cache snooping is
mentioned in briefly in RFC7626 [4].
Winter et al. [35] has worked on the privacy risk DNS
queries pose to users of the Tor service. Their work looks at
the risk of identifying users by the DNS requests going into
and out of the Tor network. There has been some discussion
over the role of VPNs as providers of privacy, anonymity and
censorship resistance. One of the earliest evaluations was from
Appelbaum et al. in 2012, who performed an assessment of
VPNs for these purposes and found them lacking overall [1].
In 2015 Perta et al. performed a similar evaluation, with some
time spent on DNS directly [25].
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present DNS cache snooping as a practical
method that we use to determine how frequently domains
are accessed over three large VPN services. We explored
three different forms of DNS cache snooping, and discovered
that cache snooping based on the TTL of DNS records is
able to stably and consistently reveal information about the
state of DNS records cache on a given server and how
frequently these records are accessed. Using this approach,
we analyse the internal DNS servers of several different VPN
providers. These VPN providers advertise their service as a
method of evading censorship and surveillance [12][16][29],
6and evidence suggests they are used for these purposes [1][25].
We ran this experiment for during April and May 2018, across
three VPNs and 2000 domains.
During this period we discovered which of these domains
were most regularly accessed through the VPN. By looking
at the time it took for the records of these domains to be
refreshed, we were able to calculate the overall frequency of
access for each of these domains. This gave us: 1) an overall
ranking of how frequently each domain was accessed through
the VPN; 2) an estimate at the total number of requests for
each domain through the VPN; 3) a breakdown of which sites
and which type of sites are popular for users of VPNs. We
did this for popular domains and again for domains we knew
to be censored in specific countries: China, Indonesia, Iran,
and Turkey. Two of the countries, China and Iran, were found
to be blocking a large amount of websites written in their
primary languages: Chinese and Farsi respectively. For these
countries we provided breakdowns of the language specific
blocked domains that were accessed over the VPN.
VIII. FUTURE RESEARCH
We are interested to see if our technique can be used to
discover how frequently attempts are made to access censored
domains within DNS censored countries. The success of this
technique depends on the specific censorship apparatus within
a country. To give an example of this, the Great Firewall of
China (GFW) employs DNS poisoning to prevent users from
resolving DNS queries for filtered domains. Users make a
query for a domain, and the GFW responds with a poisoned
DNS response. Users’ machines cache this result, stopping
them accessing censored content.
However, the original DNS response from the authentic
DNS server is still sent [11]. This response can be captured
to view the state of this record on the server, including the
record’s TTL value. By looking at this with our DNS cache
snooping implementation it is possible to see how frequently
users attempt to access censored domains. Preliminary results
indicate this approach works, and it is possible to determine
how frequently attempts are made to access censored domains
within China for a chosen DNS server. This technique is not
limited to China, and is likely applicable to other countries.
We have also looked at applying our work to the Tor
anonymity network. Tor allows clients to make DNS requests
through the network, that are then resolved by an exit node.
Requests through Tor have a static TTL so it is not as simple as
running it against VPN DNS servers 3. However, there is some
degree of flexibility in how exit node operators handle DNS
queries. Official guidance from The Tor Project suggests run-
ning caching resolvers, and if these can be accessed either from
within the Tor network or the public internet this approach
is feasible. This is arguably a security misconfiguration issue,
although given the lack of specific guidance for DNS handling
it is possible to be susceptible while following configuration
guidance [32]. Indeed, we were able to proof of concept this
3Another way of doing this against the Tor network may be the timing
based scan against an exit node, but Tor adds even more jitter noise which
would need to be removed.
against our own chosen-configuration exit node, but with a
cursory search we were not able to find other exit nodes set
up in a similar fashion. As a result we were able to generate
equivalent data on Tor domain frequency usage for our exit
node, but as we relied upon the configuration of our own exit
node to get it we do not believe it would be ethical to publish
[17]. Greschbach et al. [14] wrote on the the effect of DNS on
Tor’s anonymity, while Phillip Winter et al. [35] has looked
at the traffic flow identification via DNS requests sent through
the Tor network.
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